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1. Introduction 
Bank efficiency is not the sort of subject that sets the pulse racing or the heart 
beating faster. On the surface the subject sounds dry and could put even the most 
ardent accountant or banker to sleep. Certainly, efficiency is not the hottest topic in 
banking in the current economic climate. Improved risk management, stronger capital 
adequacy, regulation, and banker‟s remuneration stand higher in the scale of 
importance following the public opprobrium of bankers in the West. However, I hope 
to show that not only is this subject worth exploration in its own right but there is 
much insight that can be gleaned from its study that tells us something about the 
banking market in question.  
 
The efficiency of banks, relates to the efficiency of the banking market which 
in turn relates to the efficiency of the intermediation process and the efficiency by 
which monetary policy passes through to bank lending. Studies have also used 
measures of bank efficiency to explain the positive correlation (where it exists) 
between concentration and profitability as a challenge to the argument that 
concentrated markets generate anti-competitive behaviour. Other studies find a link 
between competitiveness and bank efficiency
1
. For emerging markets, the issue of 
bank efficiency has particular importance given the trend in deregulation and 
economic reform of recent decades.  
  
This paper reviews the different ways to measure bank efficiency and 
highlight the results of research on bank efficiency in Asian emerging economies. In 
particular it will outline the extent of research thus far conducted on the efficiency of 
banks in Pakistan and comment on how to build and improve upon them. 
  
The next section will examine the concept of economic efficiency. Section 3 
speculates on the possible reasons for the existence of inefficiency. Section 4 reviews 
the literature of bank efficiency in the Asian emerging economies. Section 5 presents 
some measures of cost efficiency for Pakistan. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Efficiency 
 The concept of economic efficiency comes easily to the economist. Given an 
economic objective and information on relative prices, an individual optimum is 
defined as a profit maximising objective given input and output prices, or cost 
minimisation given factor inputs and input prices. Under certain optimistic or 
restrictive assumptions, economic efficiency for the unit is generalised into an 
equilibrium that can be construed as a socially efficient equilibrium (Koopmans, 1951; 
Lange, 1942). 
 
From Farrell (1957), economic efficiency can be separated into technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency
2
. The formal definition of technical efficiency 
according to Koopmans (1951) is a case where an increase in any output requires a 
reduction in at least one other output or an increase in at least one other input. 
Similarly a reduction in any input requires an increase in at least one other input or a 
reduction in at least one output. From the definition of technical efficiency comes 
technical inefficiency which is a position where a producer could produce the same 
                                                 
1
 See for instance Al-Muharrami and Matthews (2009) for an application to GCC economies.  
2
 An excellent introduction to production economics and a review of the concepts of efficiency used 
here can be found in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and Coelli et al (2005) 
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output with less of at least one input or use the same inputs to produce more of at least 
one output. The Koopman (1951) definition of efficiency can be generalised as a 
multi-output, multi-input production technology expressed by a transformation 
function: 
     0, qxT     (1) 
 
where ),...,( 21  Mqqqq is an Mx1 vector of outputs and ),...,( 21  Nxxxx is an Nx1 
vector of inputs. Shephard (1953) defines the input distance function: 
 
     )]()/(:max[, qLxqxd     (2) 
 
which translated into layman‟s language means that the distance between the 
minimum combination of ][x  and actual ][x used to produce ][q is at a minimum. A 
measure of technical efficiency is the ratio of the minimum to actual input or: 
 
   1),(),(  qxdxqTE    (3) 
 
Now suppose the economic objective is to minimise the costs of producing 
][q  facing an input price vector ),....,( 21  Nwwww . The cost minimisation problem 
is: 
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A measure of cost efficiency CE is provided by the ratio: 
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Once cost efficiency and technical efficiency is obtained a measure of input allocative 
efficiency in the sense of Farrell (1957) is obtained as: 
 
    
),(
),,(
),,(
xqTE
xwqCE
xwqAE    (6) 
 
A diagram explains this concept a lot easier. Figure 1 shows an isoquant qq producing 
a single output with factor inputs 1x  and 2x  and isocost ww, which traces the ratio of 
factor prices. The efficient cost minimising position is shown at e where ww is 
tangential to qq. However, employing a factor combination shown by point c, which 
is to the right of the isoquant qq indicates that the unit is technically inefficient. 
Allocative inefficiency is generated by the employment of the factor mix that is 
inconsistent with the cost minimising factor mix. Technical efficiency is measured by 
the ratio Oa/Oc  and technical inefficiency (TIE) is given by ac/Oc.  
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The cost to the firm is shown by w''w'' which is parallel to ww and passes through 
point c. Cost efficiency (CE) is measured by Ob/Oc and AE is obtained residually as 
Ob/Oa. It follows that cost inefficiency (CIE) is described by bc/Oc and allocative 
inefficiency (AEI) is ab/Oa. 
 
Figure 1: Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the theoretical concepts have been established the next stage for the 
researcher is to measure inefficiency and this is where many of the problems begin. 
The research on banking efficiency has taken one of two approaches – the parametric 
and the non-parametric. The parametric approach requires the specification and 
estimation of a cost function or production function. The problem with the parametric 
approach is that errors arise due to misspecification of the function and the underlying 
stochastic process.  
 
The non-parametric approach uses linear programming techniques to envelope 
observed points of the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs. This latter method 
has been termed Date Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Unlike the parametric approach 
the DEA approach does not require a specification of an econometric model. It simply 
uses the observed data to define an efficient frontier as the envelopment of „best 
practice‟. The drawback of the DEA method is that the deviation from the efficient 
frontier represents „inefficiency‟ and not a combination of inefficiency, measurement 
error or random error. What this means is that the estimates of cost inefficiency 
obtained from the DEA approach is not amenable to statistical inference. For example, 
if cost inefficiency of a firm or unit is said to be 10% less than best practice, in what 
sense is this number significant from a statistical viewpoint? Thankfully, recent 
innovations in the literature of estimation of efficiency have been able to answer this 
question.  
O 
c 
e 
x2 
x1 
b 
a 
w 
w 
q 
q 
w' 
w' 
w'' 
w'' 
 5 
Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2008) argue that the deterministic 
DEA can produce estimates that suffer from „finite sample bias‟ and propose a 
bootstrap procedure for non-parametric frontier models. Bootstrapping is based on the 
notion that if the data can be viewed as a random sample from an underlying 
population under a specific model (data generating process - DGP), then the process 
of continuous random draws from the sample under the model generates also random 
draws from the population. The random raw can be viewed as a pseudo-sample and as 
a group of new benchmarks to compute the efficiency score for a given point
3
.  
 
In the case of parametric models the principal method of estimation of cost 
efficiency is the method of stochastic frontier analysis (SFA)
4
. Cost efficiency is 
obtained as the ratio of the estimated cost function which will represent the best 
practice frontier and the actual cost of a specific firm. So in the case of a bank i that 
produces  k outputs using  j  inputs, cost efficiency is: 
 
   
i
kiji
i
c
qwc
CE
),( ,,
   (7) 
 
Equation (7) defines cost efficiency as the ratio of minimum cost attainable to 
observed expenditure  ic . So 1iCE  and 1iCE holds only if bank i  is 100% 
efficient.  
 
 Research effort and energy has concentrated on the specification of the 
function ),( ,, kiji qwc
5
 and the overall error term associated with the econometric 
model i . The function to be econometrically estimated would in implicit form be 
described as: 
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The properties of the components of  i are that iv  is normally distributed with zero 
mean and fixed variance and: 
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The term  iu captures the extent of inefficiency and the function )( izf describes the 
process that determines the inefficiency in terms of some specific „environmental‟ 
variables  iz . Again it is easier to explain these concepts with the aid of diagram.  
                                                 
3
 Recent applications of the bootstrap approach to banking have been Casu and Molyneaux (2005), 
Dong and Featherstone (2006) and Matthews, Guo and Zhang (2007). 
4
 In an Appendix to this paper, Momna Saeed of the SBP presents the results of an up to date SFA 
model of cost efficiency for Pakistan banks.  
5
 Typical specifications in the literature are the Cobb-Douglas function, constant elasticity of 
substitution, and trans-log function. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) discuss these and also other 
specifications in chapter 4 of their book. 
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Figure 2 shows the cost function for a single output 1q . The benchmark or 
minimum cost function is described by  mc . The cost function for bank {1} is 
described by 1c . 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Cost function, cost inefficiency 
 
 
 
 
The minimum cost position is shown at point O on the „best practice‟ cost 
frontier. The cost inefficiency of bank 1 is the vertical distance between O and point 
„a‟ on the cost function associated with bank 1. The problem with the conventional 
SFA technique is that it estimates the overall cost inefficiency but does not 
decompose the estimate into its technical inefficiency and allocative inefficiency 
components. In principle Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) describe the problem as 
estimating the function:   
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Where 0Tu  represents the cost of input oriented technical inefficiency and the 
error component 0Au represents the cost of input allocative inefficiency. If the 
latter error component can be identified then the point „P‟ on the minimum cost 
function mc describes the above minimum cost generated by allocative inefficiency. 
Cost inefficiency „Oa‟ can be decomposed into technical inefficiency „ba‟ and 
allocative inefficiency „Ob‟. In reality the estimation of allocative inefficiency from 
SFA requires overly restrictive assumptions and a simple method have as yet eluded 
the literature. 
Cost 
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P 
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3. Why inefficiency? 
Studies of bank efficiency show that inefficiency tends to exist over long 
periods. Why does inefficiency exist and why doesn‟t the market provide a solution 
through a takeover mechanism whereby inefficient banks are taken over by efficient 
ones? It is possible that the banking market, particularly in emerging markets, are 
protected from hostile takeover by government and official agencies. The knowledge 
that official protection exists could generate „satisficing‟ managerial objectives that is 
not consistent with profit maximising behaviour. However, enforced merger is a 
strategy that central banks have employed in the aftermath of banking crises – see for 
example Daley et al (2008) in the case of Jamaica. 
 
 Cost inefficiency relative to 'best practice' is usually blamed on bad 
management and poor motivation. Following Leibenstein (1966) this efficiency gap is 
termed 'X-inefficiency'. Studies of bank efficiency have used the terms technical 
efficiency and X-efficiency interchangeably as if they were the same thing. While 
similar in concept they are not necessarily the same. The concept of technical 
efficiency derives its basis in the neo-classical theory of the firm and assumes profit 
maximising behaviour. A firm or a bank may be technically inefficient for technical 
reasons such as low training or low human capital levels of managers and workers, or 
the use of inferior or out-of-date technology. The diffusion of new technology is not 
instantaneous and some firms or banks may lag behind others in the acquisition and 
utilisation of new technology. With further training and updating of capital, the firm 
or bank can expect to move towards the efficient frontier described by the isoquant in 
Figure 1. X-inefficiency is not caused by the variability of skills or the time variability 
of technology diffusion but by the use and organisation of such skills and technology. 
 
In an earlier generation of studies of US banks, Berger, Hunter and Timme 
(1993) argue that X-inefficiency constitutes 20% or more of bank costs. Poor 
motivation and weak pressure resulting in under utilization of factors of production, is 
part of what Leibenstein (1975) describes as „organisational entropy‟. X-inefficiency 
arises as a result of low pressure for performance. Some institutions would be 
protected by government regulation that would reduce the external pressure of 
competition. But even with a higher degree of pressure from the environment, firms 
may have organisational deficiencies so that management signals and incentives are 
lost in the hierarchy of the organisation. 
 
An alternative interpretation of X-inefficiency is „rent seeking‟ in the sense of 
Buchanan (1980) and Tullock (1967, 1980). Rent seeking in its basic form is the 
appropriation of surplus in the process of production or exchange without any real 
contribution to the process of either. Where there are government regulations on 
enterprise, barriers to entry and other anti-competitive rules, officials have the 
opportunity to extract rents through the mechanism of bribery and corruption. 
Therefore the term rent seeking has been generally associated with extortion, bribery 
and corruption.  
 
However, a hidden but much more pervasive type of rent seeking is the 
extraction of larger budgets for bureaucracies and what results in the non-pecuniary 
rewards to workers in government owned enterprises (Tullock, 1967 and McKenzie 
and Tullock 1981).  The prestige of the senior bureaucrats is enhanced if the size of 
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the workforce is expanded to be larger than necessary to meet production targets. 
Similarly, offices are more grandiose, holidays are longer, and benefits are greater and 
so on.  
 
Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) suggest that the existence of X-inefficiency in 
production is the outcome of a rational decision making process that represents on-
the-job compensation to managers. Whereas X-inefficiency is viewed by Leibenstein 
(1966, 1978) as non-maximising behaviour, Stigler (1976) argues that its existence is 
symptomatic of firms maximising their individual utility functions. Faced with a 
target level of output, a give set of inputs and factor prices, the bureaucrat minimises 
costs subject to a Williamson (1963) type utility function that includes in it arguments 
the level of output and a subset of factor inputs. In other words for the i
th 
bank, given 
the „k‟ factor inputs, the bureaucrat minimises costs to meet a utility function which 
contains the „j‟ outputs and a subset „n‟ of factor inputs, given standard neo-classical 
technology.   
 
4. Bank efficiency in emerging markets 
 The theory of measuring efficiency is straightforward if you know precisely 
the inputs and output a firm produces. While this is quite clear in the case of a 
manufacturing firm it is not straightforward in the case of a bank. The literature 
distinguishes between two main approaches – the intermediation approach and the 
production approach. The intermediation approach recognises that the main function 
of a bank is a financial intermediary that takes in deposits and transforms them into 
loans and other earning assets. According to this approach the inputs will be deposits 
plus borrowed funds along with the traditional factors of production (labour and fixed 
assets) and the outputs will be loans and other earning assets (Sealey and Lindley, 
1977). Total costs according to this approach will be what are traditionally recognised 
as operational expenses plus total interest costs. 
 
 In contrast, the production approach recognises that a bank is a producer of a 
range of financial services. These services are to deposit holders and borrowers alike 
and include not just intermediation services but a host of other financial services that 
would be charged to the non-interest earning account. Under this approach the 
number of deposit and loan accounts plus the number of financial transaction logged 
over a period of time would be taken as the appropriate definition of output and the 
inputs will be purely labour and fixed assets (as a measure of capital in neo-classical 
production theory). Total costs would only cover operational costs and interest costs 
are excluded (Ferrier et al., 1993). The literature on bank efficiency has tended to 
produce results using the intermediation approach, largely because balance sheet and 
income account data is more readily available that what would be required for the 
production approach. 
 
 At one time most studies of bank efficiency were of the developed 
economies. Indeed, Berger and Humphrey (1997) survey 130 studies that have 
employed frontier analysis in 21 countries. Of these studies, only 8 were of 
developing and Asian countries (including 2 in Japan). Studies on US financial 
institutions were the most common, accounting for 66 out of 116 single country 
studies. However, recent years have seen a plethora of studies of emerging economies 
using frontier analysis to evaluate the effects on efficiency of deregulation and reform 
in the banking market.  
 9 
The last big area of reform in the Chinese economy remains the banking 
system. Banking reform has progressed in the Chinese fashion of cautious 
deregulation, which has attracted numerous scholars both within and without China to 
study bank efficiency
6
. Using a stochastic frontier analysis Fu and Heffernan (2007) 
find average cost inefficiency of 40% - 60% over the period 1985-2002. They also 
found that government owned banks in China is less cost efficient than other banks 
(confirmed also by Yao et al, 2007 and Zhiang et al, 2009). While confirming the 
estimates obtained by SFA Chen et al (2005) using DEA found the reverse – on 
average that state owned banks were more cost efficient than non-state owned banks. 
However, the latter findings are questionable as the conventional DEA is subject to 
finite sample bias
7
. The Chen et al (2005) findings go against the consensus which, is 
that state owned banks are less efficient than other banks. Matthews et al (2007) use a 
bootstrap methodology with DEA and confirm the findings of Fu and Heffernan 
(2007) including the finding that the average cost efficiency of the government owned 
banks was less that that of the other national banks. 
 
Studies for the Indian banking market confirm the general finding that reform 
improves bank efficiency but in contrast to the general findings for China, studies 
using DEA tend to find that government owned banks exhibit a higher level of cost 
and technical efficiency than other banks (Ray and Das, 2010; Bhattacharya et al, 
1997; Sathye, 2003, Atullah and Le, 2006). Shanmugam and Das (2004) use SFA to 
confirm that state-owned banks are more efficient than private banks but also found 
that foreign banks are more efficient than the average. 
 
The IMF restructuring policy of weak banks in for Indonesia, Korea (not an 
emerging economy), Philippines and Thailand is tested with DEA based efficiency 
measures by Ariff and Can (2009). Their findings suggest that the efficiency of 
restructured banks is no greater than the pre-IMF intervention period. However, it is 
not clear that efficiency analysis alone can provide insight into policies that have a 
long-term gestation. Efficiency in the pre- and post Asian economic crisis of 1997 is 
studied by Margono et al (2010) for Indonesia. The key finding for Indonesia is that 
cost efficiency improved in the post crisis period but increased at a lower rate than in 
the pre-crisis period suggesting that banks adopted a more cautious approach to 
expanding balance sheets and with it output after the crisis. 
 
Studies of bank efficiency in Pakistan have also been concerned with the 
effects of reform and deregulation. Studies by Iimi (2002) and Hardy and Patti (2005) 
use parametric methods to assess the effects of structural deregulation during the 
1990s. Using a distribution free approach, Ansari (2006) finds that cost inefficiency 
varied between 13% and 51% across individual banks over the period 1991-2002. The 
effect of changes in corporate governance on efficiency was examined by Ahmed 
(2006) who confirms the general finding that financial sector reforms improved 
banking sector performance and that privatized banks performed the best. 
 
                                                 
6
 For a list of studies using parametric and non-parametric methods published in Mandarin see Zhang 
(2010) 
7
 Also using DEA, Laurenceson and Zhao (2008), find a high level of cost efficiency in Chinese banks 
in the post WTO period. However once again the estimates obtained by conventional DEA is 
questionable. 
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A number of scholars have used DEA to estimate bank efficiency in Pakistan 
with the objective of assessing the effects of reform. Qayyum et al (2007) found that 
the efficiency of banks privatized during the reform process improved. Examining an 
earlier period Burki and Niazi (2010) found a decline in efficiency in the 1993-96 
period followed by an improvement thereon to 2000. The most recent study by Akhtar 
(2010) concluded that the average level of bank efficiency was low and that foreign 
banks had a higher level of efficiency than domestic banks
8
. The latter finding is also 
supported by Usman et al (2010). 
 
The efficiency of Islamic banks across a number of countries that operate 
Islamic banking systems was examined by Hassan (2006) who found that on average 
Islamic banks had a lower level of cost and technical efficiency than non-Islamic 
banks. This is also confirmed by the research of Shahid et al (2010) for Pakistan but 
only in the specific case of variable returns to scale.  
 
The findings for bank efficiency in the emerging economies can be separated 
into firm and tentative compartments. The firm finding is that deregulation and reform 
tends to improve bank efficiency. The tentative findings are that first, ownership and 
governance tend to produce mixed results depending on the economy examined. In 
some countries state owned banks are less efficient than private banks. Second, 
foreign banks tend to have a higher level of efficiency than domestic banks. Third, 
specialist banks such as Islamic banks tend to have a lower level of efficiency than 
conventional banks. 
 
A number of criticisms can be applied to the findings of researchers using the 
SFA and DEA methodology to measure bank inefficiency. With regard to SFA 
estimation of cost functions, the use of panel data provides a fixed ranking of banks 
which does not change from year to year. The implication is that a bank cannot 
improve its position relative to other banks no matter what it does – clearly an absurd 
and unpalatable conclusion. This is not a problem for researchers who use DEA 
because in principle this method can be applied yearly provided there is sufficient 
data. However, there are a number of issues with the use of DEA raise doubts about 
its general application. First, robustness of efficiency estimates using DEA is an 
important issue in many studies. Different inputs and outputs produce different results 
as in Chansarn (2008) for Thailand. Efficiency estimates are either relatively too 
volatile with some sets of inputs and outputs and performance rankings are not stable. 
The lack of robustness in DEA estimates highlights the importance of using a wide 
range of inputs and outputs and bootstrapping the results to evaluate the difference 
between sets of estimates for statistical significance. 
 
Second, researchers typically use a two-stage estimation method to explain the 
efficiency estimates obtained from DEA using Tobit-type estimation techniques. 
However, it is often that these studies are flawed by employing endogenous variables 
as explanatory terms which raise doubts about the interpretation of the findings. 
Furthermore, Simar and Wilson (2007) argue that such an approach is flawed since 
the DEA estimates are biased and serially correlated in a complicated and unknown 
way. They propose a double-bootstrap method which applies the bootstrap to the 
                                                 
8
 This is in contrast to a previous study, where Akhtar (2002) found little difference in the technical and 
allocative efficiency estimates between foreign banks and domestic banks in 1998. Rizvi (2001) that 
foreign banks underperformed domestic banks in terms of technical efficiency for the period 1993-98. 
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DEA estimate while regressing environmental and bank specific variables to the 
efficiency scores.  
 
In what follows, I present estimates of cost efficiency for Pakistan banks using 
a number of different models of inputs and outputs. Furthermore these estimates are 
obtained using the bootstrap technology of Simar and Wilson (2000a, 2000b). Third, 
HAC estimation is used to estimate the speed of reduction of inefficiency and to 
identify drivers of the inefficiency reduction. 
 
5. Cost Inefficiency in the Pakistan Banking Sector 
 In this section, I present the input and output variables used in estimating bank 
efficiency in Pakistan. Five models are estimated and the estimated cost efficiency 
scores are converted into scores of cost inefficiency. These in turn are decomposed 
into its technical inefficiency and allocative inefficiency components
9
. The models 
have the same inputs but differ in the outputs. Inputs are Labour, Capital (fixed assets) 
and Deposits and their respective prices, unit cost of labour, unit cost of fixed assets 
and unit cost of deposits.  
 
Outputs are distinguished by the treatment of non-performing loans as a bad 
output and non-interest income as an additional output. Table 1 describes the output 
data for each model. 
 
Table 1: Output vectors for Efficiency Estimation 
Model Variables 
1 Loans minus NPLs, Other Earning Assets, Non-interest income, NPL as 
bad output 
2 Loans minus NPLs, Other Earning Assets, NPL as bad output 
3 Non interest income, interest income 
4 Total Loans, Other Earning Assets, Non-interest income 
5 Total Loans, Other Earning Assets 
  
 Data was obtained from Fitch/Thompson Bankscope supplemented by SBP 
sources and covered the period 2002 – 2009. Table 2 shows the bias-corrected 
estimates of cost inefficiency and its components technical inefficiency and allocative 
inefficiency. 
 
Table 2: Bias-corrected estimates of inefficiency. Average of all banks. Standard 
deviation in parenthesis (1000 bootstraps) 
Model Cost Inefficiency Technical Inefficiency Allocative Inefficiency 
1 36.1% (21.0%) 22.5% (21.0%) 13.6% (22.7%) 
2 34.8% (19.6%) 20.4% (18.5%) 14.4% (21.3%) 
3 40.0% (18.5%) 32.7% (18.9%) 7.3% (23.2%) 
4 37.9% (19.9%) 26.9% (21.7%) 11.0% (28.5%) 
5 34.3% (18.5%) 21.4% (18.7%) 12.9% (24.3%) 
 
                                                 
9
 With the conventional DEA, allocative efficiency AE = (CE/TE) but with the bootstrap DEA, AE 
cannot be obtained in this way because the statistical property that E(x/y) ≠ E(x)/E(y). We therefore 
define cost inefficiency CIE = 1 – CE and technical inefficiency TIE = 1- TE, and allocative 
inefficiency as AIE = CIE – TIE.  
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 It can be seen that except for model 3 where the output consists of interest 
revenue and non-interest revenue, the estimates are broadly similar. Treating non-
performing loans as a bad output do not appear to have had much of an effect on the 
estimates of overall cost inefficiency. The larger picture is that cost inefficiency is 
dominated by technical inefficiency (or X-inefficiency as it is sometimes referred to).  
Table 3 provides the break down of cost inefficiency by ownership and type of bank. 
A test for the difference between the average inefficiency of banks within a particular 
category type from those that are not, is conducted. Since the distribution of the 
inefficiency scores may not be standard normal, a non-parametric test is applied 
(Mann-Whitney). The Rank-Sum test provides the probability that the particular bank 
category is part of the population. In other words it tests if the particular bank 
category can be separated from the rest. A significant value suggests that the category 
can be separated. 
 
Table 3: Cost inefficiency by bank type. Average values. ‘z’ values for rank-sum 
test 
Bank Type Cost inefficiency Technical 
Inefficiency 
Allocative 
inefficiency 
All banks 36.6% 24.8% 11.8%  
Public owned 38.4% (-0.66) 21.8% (2.97)** 16.6% (-1.20) 
Private 37.2% (-2.07)** 25.6% (5.23)*** 11.6% (-0.09) 
Foreign 18.6% (5.13)*** 16.4% (4.96)*** 2.2% (2.26)** 
Islamic 29.5% (3.35)*** 16.5% (5.93)*** 13.0% (-0.70) 
* 10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance 
 
The results suggest that there is sufficient independent variation in each bank 
category type to separate the distribution of technical efficiency from the rest of the 
population. Also the only bank category that has a distribution of allocative 
inefficiency that can be separated from the rest is foreign banks. However, these 
statistics are only indicative as the means and distribution could be signalling other 
relevant but unidentified factors.  
 
One way of identifying these other factors is to estimate the change in cost 
inefficiency and the change in allocative inefficiency between periods in terms of a 
set of determining variables. Using the concept of conditional beta-convergence from 
the growth convergence literature (Barro, 1991), a measure of the speed of 
convergence to a common level of inefficiency is obtained by regressing the change 
in the level of inefficiency on the lag of inefficiency and environmental and bank 
specific variables to allow for convergence to different levels of inefficiency. 
However it is shown by Simar and Wilson (2007) that the estimated inefficiencies 
may be serially correlated. They propose a double bootstrap procedure to adjust for 
the bias caused by the inherent correlation among the estimated inefficiencies. The 
problem of potential bias is further compounded by the existence of the lagged 
inefficiency score. Developing a valid bootstrap procedure for estimating conditional 
beta-convergence is computationally intractable. However in an attempt to deal with 
the potential serial correlation, estimates of the rate of decline of inefficiency are 
obtained using a panel GLS Heteroskedastic-Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) 
estimator.  
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The dependant variable was the yearly change in the specific type of 
inefficiency. The coefficient on the lag determines the speed of reduction of 
inefficiency to a cluster determined by the steady state values of the driving variables. 
Table 4 presents the results for cost inefficiency and allocative inefficiency using the 
HAC estimator. 
 
Table 4: HAC estimates,  2002-2009, p values in parenthesis 
Variable ΔCIE ΔAIE ΔAIE 
Intercept 69.85 (.000)*** 68.15 (.000)*** 69.03 (.000)*** 
CIE(t-1) -.817 (.000)*** - - 
AIE (t-1) - -.824 (.000)*** -.849 (.000)*** 
YEAR -.035 (.000)*** -.034 (.000)*** -.034 (.000)*** 
BRANCH .000037 (.006)*** .000078 (.000)*** .000075 (.000)*** 
FOR -.148 (.000)*** -.219 (.000)*** -.228 (.000)*** 
HHI - .000065 (.002)*** - 
CR3 - - .548 (.000)*** 
ISLAM - .117 (.000)*** .125 (.000)*** 
MODEL1 .0533 (.006)*** .0061 (.390) .0066 (.683) 
MODEL2 .0419 (.020)** .0167 (.280) .0163 (.302) 
MODEL3 .0513 (.003)*** -.0538 (.000)*** -.0541 (.006)*** 
MODEL4 .0233 (.201) -.0131 (.039)** -.0328 (.040)** 
Log Likelihood 416.3 411.7 417.2 
* 10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance 
   
 
 
The results of Table 4 have several important implications. First the negative 
coefficient on the lag of the level of inefficiency indicates a dynamic convergence to a 
cluster defined by the steady-state values of the driving variables. Here The variable 
YEAR is a trend term which shows that cost inefficiency and allocative inefficiency 
are declining over time. Banks that have a large number of branches (BRANCH) 
exhibit a higher level of inefficiency than those with a small number. Also included in 
the analysis are zero-one dummy variables to identify the different types of models 
used.  
 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 show the determinants of allocative inefficiency 
and the speed of convergence to a cluster. Allowing the trend decline in allocative 
inefficiency, banks with a larger number of branches have a higher level of allocative 
inefficiency than banks that have a smaller number. Other specific factors indicate 
that foreign banks have a lower level of allocative inefficiency (FOR – zero-one 
dummy) and Islamic banks have a higher level of allocative inefficiency (ISLAM – 
zero-one dummy). The competitive state of the banking market is picked up by two 
alternative measures of concentration – the Herfindahl Hirschman Index10 (HHI) and 
the 3-bank concentration ratio
11
 (CR3). Both measures show that even allowing for 
                                                 
10
 Measured as the sum of the square of market shares of individual banks in terms of assets. The 
banking market is said to be competitive if HHI is less than 1000, somewhat concentrated if HHI is 
1000-1800 and very concentrated if HHI is greater than 1800 (Rhoades, 1993). By this measure the 
Pakistan banking market was somewhat concentrated until 2006 when HHI fell below 1000.  
11
 The share of the market of the 3 largest banks, in terms of assets. 
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the secular decline in allocative inefficiency, the improved competitiveness of 
Pakistan banking has generated a lower level of inefficiency. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Bank efficiency is clearly a topic worthy of consideration and it is particularly 
worthy of study in the case of emerging markets. In economies where capital and debt 
markets are as yet undeveloped, the principal conduit for economy wide investment 
and saving is through the banking system. The efficiency of the banks is an indicator 
of the efficiency of financial intermediation. Furthermore, the banking sector of the 
emerging economies is facing stronger competition due to the globalisation of the 
financial system. While the trend in deregulation and global competition will be 
muted for the next few years as a result of the financial crisis, the pace will pick up 
once the world economy is stabilised.  
 Individual banks will be interested to know if they represent benchmarks for 
others to emulate or laggards that need improving. The general finding is that cost 
inefficiency is declining over time and converging on clusters defined by a small set 
of driving variables. Cost inefficiency is directly related to the number of branches a 
bank operates. With the Western banks, the improvement of cost efficiency has been 
through the downsizing of the branch network and expansion of online and telephone 
banking facilities. This may not be an appropriate policy for Pakistan, where social 
considerations may dictate the existence of unprofitable branches. This then becomes 
a constraint and not a choice variable, which suggests that any allocative inefficiency 
is actually rational. 
The conceptual problem of the meaning of efficiency is not an issue. The main 
issue is what constitutes a bank‟s input and output and what is the most appropriate 
measure of cost efficiency? To the State Bank of Pakistan this is a practical matter 
and they require a practical solution. There is no alternative to using different methods 
to triangulate to a consensus. However, it is important that the deficiencies of the 
methods used should be carefully articulated so that the policy maker is aware of the 
strengths and the weaknesses of the information on which policy is constructed. 
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